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This paper presents a method which attains recoverable privacy protection for video content distribution. The method is based on
discrete wavelet transform (DWT), which generates scaling coeﬃcients and wavelet coeﬃcients. In our method, scaling coeﬃcients,
which can be regarded as a low-resolution image of an original image, are used for producing privacy-protected image. On the
other hand, wavelet coeﬃcients, which can be regarded as privacy information, are embedded into the privacy-protected image
via information hiding technique. Therefore, privacy protected image can be recovered by authorized viewers if necessary. The
proposed method is fully analyzed through experiments from the viewpoints of the amount of the embedded privacy information,
the deterioration due to the embedding, and the computational time.
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1. Introduction
Recently, video surveillance has received a lot of attention as
a useful technology for crime deterrence and investigations
and has been widely deployed in many circumstances such as
airports, convenience stores, and banks. Video surveillance
allows us to remotely monitor a live or recorded video
feed which often includes objects such as people. Although
video surveillance contributes to realizing a secure and safe
community, it also exposes the privacy of the object in the
video.
Over the past few years, a lot of techniques on privacy
protection in video surveillance system have been proposed
[1–7]. Newton et al. [1] proposed an algorithm to protect
the privacy of the individuals in video surveillance data by
deidentifying faces. Kitahara et al. [2] proposed a video
capturing system called Stealth Vision, which protects the
privacy of the objects by blurring or pixelizing their images.
In [3], Wickramasuriya et al. protect object’s privacy based
on the authority of either object or viewers. In [4], Boyle
et al. considered face obscuring for privacy protection and
discussed the eﬀects of blurring and pixelizing. Crowley
et al. [5] proposed a method for privacy protection by
replacing an socially inappropriate original image with a
socially acceptable image using eigen-space coding tech-
nique. Chinomi et al. [6] proposed privacy-protected video
surveillance system called PriSurv, which adaptively protects
objects’ privacy based on their privacy policies which are
determined according to closeness between objects and
viewers.
Although these techniques fulfill some requirements
of privacy protection, it also has a potential security flaw
when privacy-protected videos produced by the above
techniques are distributed on the Internet, because these
techniques do not provide methods for recovering the
original videos from privacy-protected videos. For example,
suppose that a surveillance video camera is installed around
school route, and the camera distributes a privacy-protected
video on the Internet in usual case. When a crime has
occurred around school route, police wants to observe the
original image of a suspect in privacy-protected video. In
addition, when parents want to observe the situation of their
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children, they require the video as they are. Thus, in order
to improve the security of privacy-protected surveillance
system, the privacy protection which can recover the original
image from privacy-protected image is strongly required.
We refer to such privacy protection as recoverable privacy
protection.
Concerning recoverable privacy protection, several
techniques have been proposed [8–11]. Dufaux and
Ebrahimi [8] and Dufaux et al. [9] proposed a method based
on transform domain scrambling of regions of interest in a
video sequence. A pioneering work was done by Zhang et al.
[10]. They proposed a method for storing original privacy
information in video using information hiding technique,
and it can recover the original privacy information if
necessary. However, the method has the drawback that the
large amount of the privacy information must be embedded
to recover the original image since the privacy information is
obtained from the whole information of the object regions.
Even if all the privacy information could be embedded using
data compression technique, it requires huge computational
loads. In [11], Yu and Babaguchi proposed another method
to realize recoverable privacy protection. Their method
masks a real face (privacy information) with a virtual face
(newly generated face for anonymity). To deal with the
huge payload problem of privacy information hiding, the
method uses statistical active appearance model (AAM)
[12] for privacy information extraction and recovering. It is
shown that the method can embed the privacy information
into video without aﬀecting its visual quality and keep its
practical usefulness. However, the method requires a set of
face images for training statistical AAM.
In this paper, we propose a method for recoverable
privacy protection based on discrete wavelet transform
(DWT). It is well known that DWT is one of the useful
tools for multiresolution analysis. DWT generates scal-
ing coeﬃcients and wavelet coeﬃcients. Since an image
consisting of scaling coeﬃcients can be regarded as a
reduced-size image of its original, we refer to it as a
low-resolution image. A low-resolution image is used for
producing privacy-protected image by expanding it to the
size of the original image. Using wavelet coeﬃcients, together
with a low-resolution image, one can recover its original
image. Therefore, wavelet coeﬃcients are regarded as privacy
information. In order to prevent unauthorized viewers from
recovering privacy-protected image, our method embeds
wavelet coeﬃcients into the privacy-protected image via
information hiding technique. By this, the privacy-protected
image can only be recovered by authorized viewers if
necessary. Furthermore, it is shown that the amount of the
privacy information of the object can significantly be reduced
compared to Zhang’s method [10]. In addition, in contrast
with Yu’s method [11], our method requires no training
beforehand.
Some results of this paper have already been reported in
[13], where a method for bitmap image is developed. In this
paper, we extend the method so as to deal with compression
technique such as JPEG [14] and JPEG2000 [15] for content
distribution on the Internet and provide detailed algorithms
for privacy information extracting, hiding, and recovering.
Furthermore, we analyze the eﬀectiveness of the proposed
method through numerical experiments from the viewpoints
of the amount of the embedded privacy information, the
deterioration due to the embedding, and the computational
time.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show
the architecture of the proposed system. In Section 3, the
discrete wavelet transform is introduced and the new image
processing method for privacy information extraction is
proposed. The privacy information hiding and recovering are
described in Section 4. Experimental results on the proposed
method are presented in Section 5. Conclusions are made in
Section 6.
2. System Architecture
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the proposed system. In
the encoding procedure, the object region is extracted using
adaptive Gaussian mixture model [16, 17], where the object
region is defined as the least rectangular area containing
human body. Then, the privacy-protected image of the object
region is produced by expanding the low-resolution image
obtained by DWT. Next, the privacy information of the
object is extracted. In this case the privacy information
of the object region is defined as the information from
which the person corresponding to the region is identified,
that is, a set of wavelet coeﬃcients obtained by DWT for
the region. Finally, the extracted privacy information and
region information are embedded into the surveillance video
using the amplitude modulo modulation-based information
hiding scheme [18]. The locations and the order of the
embedded pixels are described by their corresponding secret
key.
When there are multiple object regions in a single
image, the obscuration for privacy protection would diﬀer
according to each object region. However, in this paper, we
do not deal with this issue for simplicity. We have considered
such an issue in [7].
For the decoding procedure, the privacy information and
region information are extracted with the procedure of the
information hiding method using the secret key. Then the
original image of the objects could be recovered by using the
encoding process in the reversed order.
3. Privacy Information Extraction
In our system, the original image of the object region is
transformed into two sets of data: a low-resolution image
and a set of wavelet coeﬃcients. This process is carried out
by using discrete wavelet transform. In what follows, first,
the discrete wavelet transform is introduced and then, the
proposed method is described.
3.1. Discrete Wavelet Transform. The discrete wavelet trans-
form (DWT) is computed by successive lowpass and highpass
filtering of discrete signal. We use a Haar discrete wavelet
transform to extract privacy information. The Haar DWT of
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image {I(m,n) | 0 ≤ m ≤ 2M − 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ 2N − 1} is given






















































m− 2p)g(n− 2q)S( j)(m,n),
(1)
where S(0)(m,n) = I(m,n), 0 ≤ p ≤ (2M/2 j+1) − 1, 0 ≤
q ≤ (2N/2 j+1) − 1. The sequences h(n) and g(n), which
correspond to the impulse responses of lowpass and highpass
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S( j)(p, q) is the scaling coeﬃcients of level j, which is
extracted by the lowpass filter h(n). The image composed of
the scaling coeﬃcients S( j)(p, q) (0 ≤ p ≤ 2M/2 j − 1, 0 ≤ q ≤
2N/2 j − 1) is referred to as the low-resolution image of level
j. W
( j)
H (p, q), W
( j)
V (p, q), and W
( j)
D (p, q) are, respectively,
the wavelet coeﬃcients of level j in vertical, horizontal,
and diagonal direction, which are extracted by the highpass
filter g(n). We refer to these wavelet coeﬃcients as a set of
wavelet coeﬃcients of level j. Figure 2 shows the result of
level 2 DWT, which is composed of a low-resolution image
of level 2 and a set of wavelet coeﬃcients from level 1 to level
2. As defined above, low-resolution image given by DWT
can be regarded as a down sampling of the original image.
Therefore, if we expand the low-resolution image to the size
of the original image, a mosaic image could be obtained,
in which the original information can be protected. If the
level of DWT is large enough, the low-resolution image of
the object region can protect the object’s privacy, although
the amount of the set of wavelet coeﬃcients to be embedded
becomes large. Figure 3 shows the results of low-resolution
images, which are expanded to the original image size.
3.2. DWT-Based Privacy Information Extraction. We can
extract the bounding box of the object in the surveillance
video, using the background subtraction method of adaptive
Gaussian mixture model [16, 17]. The bounding box is
referred to as an object region. We transform the object
region from (R,G,B) color space to (Y ,Cb,Cr) color space
where Y is the luminance component, and Cb and Cr are
the blue and red chrominance components, respectively.
According to the fact that human eyes are only sensitive to the
luminance but not sensitive to the chrominance, the sensitive
privacy information is only included in Y image. Therefore,
we apply the DWT-based method presented in Section 3.1
for Y images and produce the low-resolution image Ys and
the set of wavelet coeﬃcients Yw. When Y image is given by
{I(m,n)|0 ≤ m ≤ 2M − 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ 2N − 1} and level j DWT
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(3)
where Nl = 2(N−l) − 1 and Ml = 2(M−l) − 1. Since Yw
is a one-dimensional array consisting of 2M+N − 2M+N−2 j
wavelet coeﬃcients, we also express Yw as Yw = {az | z =
1, . . . , 2M+N − 2M+N−2 j}. Let Y ′s be the image obtained by
expanding image Ys to the size of image Y . The privacy-
protected image is produced by replacing Y by Y ′s and
transform to (R,G,B) color space. Finally, the set of wavelet
coeﬃcients Yw and the coordinates of the most top-left
and bottom right pixels of the object region are embedded
by applying amplitude modulo modulation. In usual case,
images are compressed before Internet transmission by JPEG
and so on. For protecting the embedded data from the image
compression, we embed the privacy information and region
information into the frequency domain of the privacy-
protected image after quantization. As compression format,
JPEG and JPEG2000 are used in our method. Figure 4 shows
the structure of the privacy-protected image compression
and information hiding. The details of the embedding
method are described in the next section.
4. Privacy Information Hiding and Recovering
Let the size of image Y be 2M × 2N and let the level of DWT
be j. Then, the encoded data sequence E = {e1, e2, . . .} which
is embedded in privacy-protected image is generated by the
set of wavelet coeﬃcients Yw = {az | z = 1, . . . , 2M+N −
2M+N−2 j}. The process is shown in Algorithm 1.














































































Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the system.
We apply run length coding for the intervals consisting of
successive zeros, since, as shown in Figure 5, a histogram of
wavelet coeﬃcients of an image is distributed around 0 with
small variance in general.
Next, embed the encoded data sequence E = {e1, e2, · · · }
to the frequency domain of the privacy-protected image after
quantization via amplitude modulo modulation (AMM)
[18] according to the following equation:
Fk = arg min
F∈S(ek ,3)
|F − Fk|, (4)
where S(ek, 3) is the set of integers given by S(ek, 3) =
{F | F ≡ ek (mod 3)}. And Fk and Fk are the frequency
components at frequency k before and after embedding,
respectively, and the frequencies for embedding are described
by a secret key. Therefore, only the viewer who has the secret
key can extract the embedded information from the image.
The embedded color component is in the order of Cr, Cb, Y .
Finally, we can obtain a compressed privacy-protected image
after the entropy coding of JPEG/JPEG2000.
For the recovering procedure, the privacy information
and region information are extracted by taking the congru-
ence modulo 3 of the corresponding pixel values. Then the
original image of the object is obtained by the recovering
process of the Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Results of low-resolution images, which are expanded to the original image size. (a) original image; (b) result of level 3 DWT; (c)
result of level 5 DWT.
5. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of proposed
method through several experiments. The video sequences
used for the experiments are ice (352×288), ice (704×576),
and deadline (352 × 288). In experiments, we apply JPEG
for compression. In Figure 6, an original image, a privacy-
protected image with privacy information embedded, and a
recovered image of ice are shown in Figures 6(a) and 6(b),
and 6(c), respectively. In a similar manner, corresponding
images of deadline are shown in Figure 7.
For each video sequence, the average number of pixels of
object regions per frame and the average number of bits for
embedded data sequences per frame at diﬀerent DWT levels
are shown, respectively, in Tables 1 and 2.
From Tables 1 and 2, we can observe that the number of
pixels of object regions and the amount of embedded data
sequence of ice (704 × 576) are about four times larger than
those of ice (352 × 288). This is quite natural because the
resolution of ice (704 × 576) is four times larger than that
of ice (352 × 288). We can also observe that the amount of
embedded data sequences of deadline (352 × 288) is larger
than that of ice (704 × 576), whereas the numbers of pixels
of object regions of deadline (352× 288) and ice (352× 288)
are similar.
In the following, we consider the influence of the
above values on the performance of the proposed method.
We employ the following three measures for performance
evaluation: API, PSNR, and processing time.



































Figure 4: The structure of the privacy-protected image compression and information hiding.
API is an abbreviation of Average of Privacy Information
and is defined as follows:
API = total number of bits for embedded data sequences






Namely, API is the average of the required bits of data
sequences for recovering one pixel in the object regions and
is regarded as a measure of the amount of privacy infor-
mation which should be embedded. API is also calculated
by using the following equation, which is equivalent to
(5):
API = average number of bits for embedded data sequences per frame
average number of pixels of object regions per frame
. (6)
Therefore, API can be calculated by Tables 1 and 2.
PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio) is used as a measure
of deterioration of recovered image and is also used for eval-
uating the influence of embedded data sequence on privacy-
protected image. PSNR between K˜[m,n, l] andK[m,n, l]
(m = 0, . . . ,H − 1;n = 0, . . . ,W − 1; l = 0, . . . ,C − 1) is
defined as follows:





















H ·W · C .
(8)
5.1. Evaluation of the Amount of Privacy Information and
the Deterioration Due to Embedding. APIs of each video
sequence for diﬀerent levels of DWT under the condition
Δ = 1 are shown in Figure 8. From Figure 8, we can observe
that API tends to be large as DWT level increases. However,
API hardly increases when the level is larger than 2 and does
not exceed 3 bit/pixel. Therefore, we could embed all the
privacy information into three color channels Y , Cb, and Cr
of the privacy-protected image, even if the level of DWT is
large and the object region size is equal to the size of the
whole image. On the other hand, using the method of [10],
API becomes 24 bit/pixel (= 8 bit/pixel/channel ×3 channel)
when the data to be embedded consist of whole information
of the object regions.
Next, we consider the deterioration of the privacy-
protected image due to the privacy information embedding.
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Table 1: Average number of pixels of object regions per frame (pixel/frame).
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
ice (352 × 288) 3.28× 104 3.65× 104 3.57× 104 3.35× 104 2.92× 104
ice (704 × 576) 1.60× 105 1.58× 105 1.55× 105 1.49× 105 1.36× 105
deadline (352 × 288) 3.52× 104 3.47× 104 3.39× 104 3.17× 104 2.76× 104
Table 2: Average number of bits for embedded data sequences per frame (bit/frame).
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
ice (352 × 288) 3.83× 104 5.55× 104 5.84× 104 5.63× 104 4.84× 104
ice (704 × 576) 1.63× 105 2.08× 105 2.18× 105 2.14× 105 1.98× 105
deadline (352 × 288) 6.10× 104 7.68× 104 7.98× 104 7.63× 104 6.68× 104
Table 3: Average CPU time for generating recoverable privacy-protected image per frame (sec/frame).
level 1 level 2 level 3 level 4 level 5
ice (352 × 288) 0.139 0.142 0.144 0.144 0.140
ice (704 × 576) 0.646 0.662 0.668 0.664 0.661
deadline (352 × 288) 0.137 0.142 0.142 0.143 0.140
Table 4: Average CPU time for recovering image per frame (sec/frame).
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
ice (352 × 288) 0.110 0.112 0.112 0.110 0.110
ice (704 × 576) 0.452 0.472 0.478 0.478 0.467
deadline (352 × 288) 0.109 0.113 0.114 0.113 0.112






Figure 5: Histogram of wavelet coeﬃcients.
The deterioration due to embedding can be estimated by (7)
and (8). Since amplitude modulo modulation in Section 4
uses congruence modulo 3, |K˜[m,n, l] − K[m,n, l]| in (8)
becomes less than or equal to 2. Therefore, an upper bound





















H ·W · C = 4.
(9)
By this inequality, we obtain






This result implies that the deterioration of the privacy-
protected image due to the embedding of privacy informa-
tion is small enough so that we can ignore the influence of
the embedding.














Figure 7: Video sequence: deadline (352× 288), DWT level: j = 4, quantization step size: Δ = 1, compression: JPEG.
5.2. Evaluation of the Deterioration of the Recovered Image.
Here, we evaluate the deterioration of the recovered image by
PSNR between the original image and the recovered image.
Figures 9 and 10 show the PSNR of the recovered image for
ice (352 × 288) and deadline (352 × 288) at the diﬀerent
quantization step size Δ and the diﬀerent DWT levels. From
Figures 9 and 10, we observe that PSNR becomes small as
Δ becomes large. Almost PSNRs are larger than 30 (dB).
Therefore, the proposed method can recover the image with
low deterioration by appropriate choice of DWT level and
quantization step size. We can also observe that PSNR of
deadline (352 × 288) is worse than that of ice (352 × 288).
This is due to the fact that the embedded data sequence of
deadline (352× 288) is larger than that of ice (352× 288) as
shown in Table 2.
5.3. Evaluation of Computational Time. Computational time
for generating recoverable privacy-protected image and
that for recovering image are shown in Tables 3 and 4,
respectively, for each video sequence at diﬀerent DWT levels
under the condition Δ = 1. From Tables 3 and 4, together
with Tables 1 and 2, we observe that the influence of the
resolution on computational time is dominant, whereas
DWT level, the amount of embedded data sequence, and the
number of pixels of object regions have an insignificant eﬀect
on the computational time.
The generation of recoverable privacy-protected image
consists of the following four processes: object extraction,
expanding low-resolution image after DWT, JPEG com-
pression, and privacy data embedding. As for the image
recovering, we have the following three processes, that is,
privacy data extraction, JPEG decompression, and IDWT
after shrinking low-resolution image. The rate of each
process in generating recoverable privacy-protected image
and that for image recovering are shown in Figures 11 and
12, respectively. From Figures 11 and 12, we can observe
that computational costs for object extraction, privacy data
embedding, privacy data extraction, and image recovering
are very small compared to the costs for image compression.
Therefore, our proposed method can be applied for real
time processing, provided that the computational time for
compression can be small.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a method which attains
recoverable privacy protection for video content distribu-
tion. By the proposed method, all the privacy information
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• Input:
Set of wavelet coeﬃcients: Yw = {az | z = 1, . . . ,α} (α = 2M+N − 2M+N−2 j)
Quantization step size of the privacy information: Δ
• Processing:
Step1 : Generate the quantized data sequence Yw(Δ) = {a′z = az/Δ	 | z = 1, . . . ,α} by
quantizing Yw = {az | z = 1, . . . ,α}, where c	 is the largest integer
that does not exceed c.
Step2 : Find the intervals [xi, yi](i = 1, . . . ,β) consist of successive zeros (but the number
of zeros is more than 2) from the data sequence Yw(Δ), where β, xi, yi are the number of
such intervals,the ith smallest element of the set of starting points of successive zeros
{x | 1 ≤ x ≤ α, a′x = a′x+1 = 0, a′x−1 /= 0}, and the ith smallest element of the set
of end points of successive zeros {y|1 ≤ y ≤ α, a′y = a′y+1 = 0, a′y−1 /= 0}.
For this calculation, we suppose a′0 = a′α+1 = 1.
Step3 :
For (z = 1, . . . ,α):
For (i = 1, . . . ,β):
If (z ∈ [xi, yi]):
If (z = yi): Encode the data sequence of the interval [xi, yi] with the run length
coding, and add it to the data sequence E. Then Goto Next z
Else (xi ≤ z < yi): Goto Next z
If (a′z ≥ 0): Encode a′z to binary bits, and add the binary bits to the data sequence E with
delimiter digit 2.
Else (a′z < 0): Encode a
′
z to binary bits, and add the binary bits sandwiched by
the sign bit 0 and delimiter digit 2 to the data sequence E.
• Output:
Data sequence to be embedded: E = {e1, e2, . . .}
Algorithm 1
DWT level














Figure 8: API for the diﬀerent level of DWT.
can be embedded into the privacy-protected image even
if the level of DWT is large and the object region size is
equal to the size of the whole image. We also show that
proposed method recovers the privacy-protected image with
low deterioration, and the computational time for privacy
protection and image recovering is small.
Δ


















Figure 9: PSNR of recovered image. (ice (352× 288)).
The proposed method is based on the idea that the
privacy information needed for recovering video sequence is
embedded in the video sequence itself (which is referred to
as self-recoverable), and only authorized viewers can extract
the privacy information. An alternate approach is that the
privacy information for recovering video sequence is stored
10 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
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Figure 10: PSNR of recovered image. (deadline (352× 288)).
CPU time (s)













DWT & expanding low resolution image
JPEG compression
Privacy data embedding
Figure 11: Rates of CPU time of each processing for generating
recoverable protected image.
outside (e.g., in a server), and only authorized viewers can
access the privacy information. Such a system would be more
secure than self-recoverable system, although the system is
inferior with respect to the convenience. It is desirable to
develop the system that can deal with both methods for
protecting privacy information.
Currently, we use the same DWT level for each object
region in a single image. However, it is better to change
the DWT level adaptively according to the size of object
region since the permissible visible detail of each object is not
identical. The realization of this function is one of our future
CPU time














Shrinking low resolution image & IDWT
Figure 12: Rates of CPU time of each processing for image
recovering.
work. In our current method, when JPEG2000 is applied for
image compression, we have to calculate DWT twice; one is
for image compression using 5–3 filter, and another one is
for privacy protection using Haar bases. If these two DWTs
can be unified, the process of recoverable privacy protection
becomes much simpler, and the computational time will be
further reduced. The development of such methods is also
our future work.
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